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Johannes Giesinger
Free Will and Education
It  is  commonly  assumed  that  to  educate  means  to  control  or  guide  a  person’s  acting  and  
development. On the other hand, it is often presupposed that the addressees of education must be  
seen  as  being  endowed  with  free  will.  The  question  raised  in  this  paper  is  whether  these  two  
assumptions are  compatible.  It  might  seem that if  the  learner  is  free in her  will,  she cannot  be  
educated; however, if she is successfully educated, then it is doubtful whether she can be seen as free.  
Inspired by the current philosophical debate on the compatibility of free will and determinism, this  
paper spells out two versions of this dilemma. The first version relies on the idea that to be free means  
being the causal source of one’s actions. The second formulation refers to the notion of freedom as the  
ability to act otherwise than the way one actually acts. The solution to the dilemma that is developed  
in this paper, however, uses a third concept of free will  – to be free means being able to act on  
reasons.
Education is usually seen as a form of heteronomy. What this means can be spelled out in 
various ways. The intention to educate might be connected with the aim to influence, to 
guide,  to  control  or  determine  someone  else’s  behaviour  and  development.  Although 
educational interferences often go along with constraints on the other person’s freedom of 
action – that is,  her freedom to do what she wants – they are ultimately directed at the  
other’s personal traits. We might say that the educator intends to shape the learner’s values 
and beliefs and to mould her self or her will. This raises the question whether education is 
compatible with the learner’s freedom of will.1
First, we might ask whether her will can ever be seen as truly free if it is successfully  
moulded by education. It seems that what he thinks, what he wants and how he acts can 
never be truly his, since it is being brought about by education and other factors beyond his 
control.  On the other hand, if we consider the learner as endowed with a free will, then it 
might seem impossible to educate him at all. Seemingly, if his present and future actions 
stem from a will that is genuinely free, then they will be independent from any educational 
influence.  Hence,  the  education  of  a  person  endowed  with  free  will  appears  to  be 
impossible – either we give up the notion of the learner’s freedom or we give up the idea  
that education is possible.
The formulation of this dilemma relies on the notion of  true or  genuine freedom of the 
will. To speak of true freedom implies that there are [516] weaker notions of free will that 
might be compatible with education. In the philosophical debate on the compatibility of 
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free  will  and  determinism,  it  is  common  to  distinguish  between  strong  and  weak 
conceptions of freedom. Among the strong conceptions are those that can be labelled as 
source libertarian. Their core idea is that we can only see ourselves as free agents, if we are 
the ultimate (causal) source of our actions. In the first part of this paper, I will examine 
whether the adoption of this view truly leads us into the dilemma stated above. In this  
section,  my interest  will  focus on the accounts  of  Immanuel Kant and Galen Strawson. 
Kant’s view of freedom has been widely discussed in German pedagogy since the early 
nineteenth century. Johann Friedrich Herbart criticised Kant’s transcendental philosophy 
from an educational point of view saying that the idea of transcendental freedom would 
leave no room for moral education.2
Kant’s view is source libertarian in some sense though it cannot be identified completely 
with current source libertarian or agent-causalist accounts. The idea of agent-causation, and 
libertarianism in general, usually relies on an indeterministic picture of nature. In contrast, 
Kant claims that it is proper to see the natural world as fully determined. Thus, he does not 
seem to be an  incompatibilist who denies the compatibility of free will and determinism; 
however, his view clearly differs from current compatibilist accounts. Galen Strawson is 
neither a compatibilist nor a libertarian incompatibilist. Since his main argument does not 
rely on the notion of determinism, it would be inadequate to call him a  hard determinist. 
Hard determinists are incompatibilists who deny the possibility of free will because they 
believe in the truth of  determinism. Strawson thinks that  freedom of  will  is  impossible 
under both deterministic and indeterministic conditions.
Among the defenders of libertarian incompatibilism, there are,  roughly speaking, two 
groups. The first group is source libertarians, who claim that free will is incompatible with 
determinism, because under deterministic conditions, we could not see ourselves as the real 
originators of our actions. The second group – call them leeway libertarians3 – puts emphasis 
on a different point; namely, if determinism were true, there would always be only one 
course of action open to us. As deliberators, however, we see ourselves as having an open 
future – i.e., what will happen is not predetermined, but depends on our decision. The idea 
that two or more paths are open to us is certainly an important aspect of our everyday 
understanding of freedom. This intuitive notion underlies a second version of the dilemma 
stated above – how is it possible to educate a person if, as a free being, she can always do  
other than that which is expected of her? This aspect of the problem will be discussed in the 
second section of this paper. 
Being the source of one’s actions
Galen Strawson,4 like Kant,5 is interested in a notion of free will that can ground the idea of 
moral responsibility. Both share the view that in order  [517] for a person to be morally 
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responsible for her actions, she has to be  ultimately responsible for them. This basic idea is 
expressed in  Kant’s  concept  of  transcendental  freedom:  a  person who has  this  kind of 
freedom possesses the ability to start a causal chain without being influenced by some other 
cause. Thus, as a transcendentally free person, she stands outside the realm of natural laws. 
Kant claims that, as moral actors, we have to presuppose that we own this kind of ultimate 
freedom. He refuses, however, to prove this theoretically. Instead, his aim is to show that 
the  idea  of  transcendental  freedom  is  not  inconsistent  and  is,  in  this  sense,  possible. 
Strawson,  in  contrast,  aims  to  demonstrate  the  impossibility  of  the  idea  of  ultimate 
responsibility.
Strawson’s basic argument is simple. First, he assumes that each of our actions can be 
traced back to our self – we act as we act because we are who we are. Second, he states that  
in  order  to  be  ultimately  responsible  for  our  actions,  we  would  have  to  be  ultimately 
responsible  for  our  selves.  This  however,  he  says,  is  impossible.  Therefore,  Strawson 
concludes, we cannot be ultimately responsible for our actions. In other words, the concept 
of ultimate responsibility implies that it is possible to be the cause of oneself (causa sui), at 
least  with  respect  to  one’s  wants,  values  or  beliefs.  But,  according  to  Strawson,  it  is 
impossible for a person to be the ultimate cause of her mental states and actions. 
How is this argument related to the dilemma stated in the introduction? Education is 
among the factors that  mould our self.  It  is  clear that we do not choose or control  our 
educator’s actions and thus we are not (ultimately) responsible for our education; however, 
then we are not responsible for our self or our actions. Since our actions can be traced back  
to our education (and other factors beyond our control),  we do not possess the kind of  
radical freedom that is – according to Strawson – necessary for moral responsibility. 
I would like to briefly mention three objections to this view. According to the first, an adult 
person can be seen as (partially) responsible for her self because she has the opportunity to 
change her view of the world and her identity. Her reflexive powers enable her to transform 
her self. She can ask herself whether that which she thinks or wants is right, true, rational or 
adequate. Also, she can deliberate upon what kind of person she is and wants to be. Thus,  
she can question her current identity and undertake an effort to change it. In response to  
this objection, Strawson replies that the possible decision to change our self is itself rooted 
in our self. Thus, we develop the desire to change simply because we are who we are.
According  to  the  second objection,  ultimate  responsibility  in  Strawson’s  sense  is  not 
necessary to ground moral responsibility. Again, we could turn to the idea of the reflexive 
person to specify this objection – as reflexive persons, we have the ability to decide which of 
our wants and beliefs should count as reasons for our actions. If we are able to act on reasons 
with which we identify,  then we are  morally  responsible for our actions.  According to 
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Strawson, of course, this (compatibilist) account of responsibility that neglects the causal 
history of our decisions is much too weak.
[518] A third objection claims that being ultimately responsible for our actions would not 
be valuable for us as agents. As persons who exist and develop over time, it is important for 
us that our actions are connected with our selves; we do not want to act independently of  
who we are, but in coherence with it. We want to express ourselves through our actions. It  
would  be  frightening if  the  connection between our  selves  and our  actions  were  to  be 
broken; if this were the case, how then could our actions ever be ours?
These objections imply a theory of freedom that can be seen as an alternative to source 
libertarianism: According to this alternative view, having a free will means to be able to act 
on reasons one identifies with. 
Galen Strawson’s argument clarifies what is meant by the first horn of our dilemma (in its 
first version): if we are educated, then we cannot be free. Kant’s theory of freedom helps to 
understand the first as well as the second horn of the dilemma: if we are free, then we 
cannot be educated. Kant distinguishes the empirical character of the human self from its 
intelligible character; in other words, he distinguishes the phenomenal from the noumenal 
self. Since we have been endowed with an empirical character, we are part of the natural  
world that has to be seen as fully determined by causal laws. In the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant writes:
‘…all the actions of men in the [field of] appearance are determined in conformity 
with the order of nature, by their empirical character and by other causes that cooperate 
with this character; and if we could exhaustively investigate all the appearances of men’s 
wills, there would not be found a single human action which we could not predict with 
certainty, and recognize as proceeding necessarily from its antecedent conditions.’
And he concludes: ‘So far, then, as regards this empirical character, there is no freedom’ 
(Kant  1965,  A549-50/B577-8).  The  empirical  character  of  the  human  being  exists  and 
develops in space and time. Its development can certainly be influenced by education. The 
problem  is,  however,  that  this  phenomenal  self  does  not  possess  freedom.  Hence,  the 
moulding of the empirical self cannot be seen as the education of a free self, or an education 
for freedom. It cannot, therefore, be a moral education in the genuine sense, though it might 
lead the individual to act according to the demands of morality. A genuinely moral action 
cannot, says Kant, spring from the empirical self. It must have its source in the noumenal 
self,  which is to be situated outside the realm of nature.  To be free in a sense that can 
ground morality means to be able to start a causal chain without being influenced by other 
causes (ibid., B 582/A554). Thus, if we hold the agent morally responsible for his actions, 
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then  we  have  to  see  him  as  an  unmoved  mover.  According  to  Kant,  this  idea  can  be 
elucidated only through the concept of a self that is not itself empirical.
Kant’s view that we are endowed with a self that is not influenced by education raises 
the question of whether the education of a free self is possible at all. This is the second horn 
of our dilemma. As becomes clear [519] in many of his writings, especially his pedagogical 
lectures, Kant is far from denying the possibility of education: ‘Kant has a sophisticated and 
detailed account of moral education that goes well beyond the kind of education a person 
would receive in the course of ordinary childhood experience’, writes Kate Moran (2009, p. 
471). His theory of freedom however – or more generally his theory of morality – seems to 
leave no room for moral education.6
Commentators on Kant’s account of  free will  have,  not surprisingly,  emphasized the 
question of how the interplay of the phenomenal and the noumenal self should be imagined 
–  how  can  the  very  same  action  be  seen  as  both  fully  determined and  radically  free? 
Furthermore,  how can the  noumenal  self  and its  free  decisions  become effective  in  the 
empirical world if this world has to be seen as fully determined? From an educational point  
of  view,  the  crucial  question  is:  can  the  moulding of  the  empirical  character  have any 
impact on the intelligible character?
There are, roughly speaking, two readings of Kant’s theory of the two selves. According 
to the first, the selves belong to two different worlds and are therefore two selves in the  
strict sense.  According to the second, we should not speak of two different entities but  
rather of two aspects of one and the same entity.7 Thus, it is not that our self is divided, but 
that we can see ourselves from two different perspectives: (1) as belonging to the realm of  
nature or (2) as radically free agents.
If  we  follow  the  two-worlds  interpretation,  then  there  seems  to  be  no  space  for 
education. We cannot imagine that the education of one self can influence another self that 
is radically separated from the first. If we adhere to the two-aspects reading, then we face a 
similar problem. We might say that the agent, considered as an empirical being, is educable. 
On the other hand, however, this very same person – as a moral agent – should consider 
himself as independent from any empirical influence.8 He should not let himself be guided 
by motivations or measures that he acquired during his upbringing. If the agent can free 
himself  in  this  way,  Kant  says,  then  he  is  acting  in  accordance  with  the  categorical  
imperative. 
A related difficulty springs from Kant’s idea that the noumenal self  is  in some sense 
‘timeless’, that is, not embedded in the temporal structure of the natural world. The point is  
that some of the core concepts of educational thought – like development,  learning and 
education – only make sense if the human individual can be considered as changing in time. 
Herbart (1835/1964,  §1-5) uses the concept of  Bildsamkeit – that can only imprecisely be 
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translated as  educability9 – to formulate his pedagogical critique of Kantian transcendental 
philosophy. He says that Kant’s transcendental subject cannot be conceived as bildsam, that 
is, as having a moral will that develops from an indefinite into a definite state. Therefore, 
Herbart states, Kant’s concept of the free person is of no use within educational thought.
Here, we can distinguish between two problems.  First,  it should be noted that Kant’s 
account leaves no room for the idea that noumenal selves evolve in time: these selves, it 
seems, are always already there. The idea that we are born without transcendental freedom 
and acquire the [520] capacity to initiate our acts in developmental processes does not make 
sense,  within Kant’s framework.  There can be no development  of noumenal selves,  and 
moreover, no development within noumenal selves. The second problem is as follows: Kant 
explicitly states that nothing happens, and nothing changes within the noumenal self (Kant 
1781/1965, B569/A541). Here, we should make the distinction between the initiation of an  
act and the reasons on which someone acts. The first problem concerns the first of these aspects, 
whereas  the  second  refers  to  the  development  of  our  reasons.  Kant  assumes  that  the 
transcendentally free person acts on the categorical imperative. Thus, this moral principle 
provides the reasons for acting. We usually assume that persons develop into agents who act 
on moral reasons. During their personal history, they learn the reasons they are to act on. 
But acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, it seems, is nothing that can – or 
has to – be learned.
These are problems specific to Kant’s account of freedom. Current versions of source 
libertarianism avoid the dubious idea of timeless agency. Nevertheless,  some libertarian 
views face similar difficulties. First, they have to explain how the ability to initiate an act 
can arise within the individual. The second difficulty was already mentioned in the critique 
of Strawson’s account: in claiming that free actions can be radically ours, in the sense that 
they are ultimately caused by us, the source libertarian view raises the question of how 
these actions can be  ours in a different sense – namely,  how can they be related to our 
personal history, our identity, our reasons? If our actions are detached from the person that 
we have become during the long processes of learning, then our actions might be ours in the 
first sense, but not in the second. From an educational point of view, the problem is as 
follows: to make sense of the idea of education, the free acting of persons must in some way 
be related to their personal history and education. Our dilemma arises if this connection 
breaks down.
Note, that it does not matter, in this context, how we specify the idea that education is a  
form of  heteronomy – it  is  irrelevant  whether  we see  the  learner  as  (deterministically) 
controlled  or  merely  as  influenced  or  guided  by  education.  In  all  these  cases,  the 
educational  interference  might  become effective  in  the  learner’s  acting.  If  this  happens, 
however, the learner cannot be considered as free,  according to the libertarian view. To 
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solve our dilemma, then, it would be important to allow that the reasons that we acquired 
during our upbringing play a role in our present acting.10
This leads us back to the reasons-based view of freedom that was used in the objections 
to  Strawson’s  account:  a  person is  free  if  she  act  on reasons  she  accepts  as  valid.  This 
account is further developed in the next section where the second version of our dilemma 
comes into view. 
Being capable of doing otherwise
As deliberators, we usually presuppose that there is more than one course of action open to 
us. If our actions were predetermined, then it would not  [521] make sense to deliberate 
which action to perform. Under the conditions of determinism, however, we could never 
act otherwise than the way in which we actually act. The subjective belief in our ability to 
act in alternate ways would be illusory, from an objective point of view. If the world we are 
a part of were fully determined, does this mean that it would be inappropriate to view 
ourselves as free persons? The adherents of compatibilist accounts of free will reject this 
conclusion. Many of them defend some version of the reasons-based account of freedom 
introduced above. The fact of determinism, they claim, would not destroy our ability to act 
on reasons we endorse.
The question is whether a compatibilist account of this kind provides a solution to our 
dilemma,  in  its  second  version.  In  putting  the  question  this  way,  we  presuppose  a 
deterministic understanding of education. The dilemma might be stated as follows: if the 
learner possesses the ability to do other than that which is intended by the educator, then he 
cannot be educationally determined. If, however, he is educationally determined, he cannot 
be ascribed the ability to do otherwise.
Here, it is important how exactly we understand the idea of educational heteronomy. 
Above,  I  roughly  distinguished weak forms of  heteronomy (e.g.  influencing or  guiding 
someone)  from  stronger  forms  (controlling  or  determining  the  other’s  behaviour  and 
development). The second version of the dilemma relies on a strong form of educational 
heteronomy.
Note that we could develop a similar line of thought using a non-deterministic notion of 
education. If the learner is always able to act otherwise, then the educator can never be 
certain  about  the  success  of  his  pedagogical  attempts.  This  is  a  reformulation  of  the 
dilemma’s first horn. The second horn loses its relevance if we do not use a deterministic  
concept of education: education (as based on the intention to guide or influence a learner 
without  controlling  him deterministically)  does  not  threaten  the  learner’s  ability  to  act 
otherwise.
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In contrast, if he is educationally determined, he can only do what the educator intends 
him to do. He has only one way to go and is, in this sense, unfree. We might, however, be 
tempted to deny this last conclusion. According to a compatibilist account of free will, the 
ability to do otherwise is not constitutive of our freedom.
The notion of educational determination implies that it is possible to gain full control 
over an other person’s willing and acting. We might think of some forms of authoritarian 
indoctrination or brainwashing that attempt to „implant“ certain beliefs or motivations in 
someone else’s self. It is uncontroversial, among compatibilists, that a person who is moved 
by a strong desire that was induced to her by manipulative methods, but that she herself 
does  not  identify  with,  is  not  free.  Consider,  by  contrast,  cases  where  the  learner’s 
identification with certain reasons is brought about („determined“) by such methods. Some 
compatibilists  defend  the  view  that  this  kind  of  educational  determination  is  indeed 
compatible with the learner’s free will and moral responsibility.11 According to this view, it 
is  unnecessary  to  take  the  history  of  a  person’s  values  or  beliefs  into  account  –  it  is 
irrelevant how these were acquired.
[522] This, however, conflicts with wide-spread intuitions: When a child is „made“ to 
accept certain normative attitudes, this appears as a strong form of coercion. In contrast to 
other  sorts  of  coercion,  the  coerced  person  is  unaware  of  being  coerced  –  from  her 
perspective,  she  does  what  she  really  wants  to  do.  But  the  fact  that  the  educator’s 
manipulative interference does only show itself from a third (or second) person’s point of 
view  might  lead  us  to  the  conclusion  that  it  threatens  the  child’s  freedom  even  more 
seriously than other forms of heteronomy. Manipulative control – in contrast to other sorts 
of heteronomy – bypasses the learner's ability to respond to the educational demands. I 
hold that the ability to reject (or accept) a demand stemming from outside is constitutive of 
a  person’s  freedom. Hence,  when a child lacks  this  ability,  it  cannot be said that  he is  
educated as a free person. He then appears as a passive object of a pedagogical treatment, not 
as a participator in his own educational process.
One could object  by claiming that  children –  at  least  small  children – do not  have the 
competency  to  deliberate  adequately.  Thus,  their  refusal  or  acceptance to  do  what  is 
pedagogically  desired  might  be  unqualified.  According  to  a  similar  objection,  a  child’s 
decision to reject a pedagogical demand does not really express her own values or identity, 
because she does not yet have a stable identity.12
Here, I propose to make the distinction between a concept of basic freedom on the one 
hand, and fully-fledged rational competency and autonomy on the other hand. Children 
from  the  age  of  two  or  three  are  able  to  act  on  reasons  in  a  basic  way  that  neither 
presupposes a fully developed capacity to reason nor a deeply rooted set of values and 
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beliefs.13 This capability that I call basic freedom is compatible with an uncritical acceptance 
of pedagogical demands, that is, with learning from an authority. We might distinguish the 
initial acceptance of a consideration as a reason from a stronger form of identifying with 
normative commitments. The idea is, then, that reasons that are (initially) accepted by the 
child are his in a weak sense –  they are not (yet) part of his identity. In successful processes 
of education, those reasons that one is prompted to accept gradually become one’s own in a 
strong sense.14
The reasons-based account of freedom might be contrasted with Niklas Luhmann’s view of 
freedom.  In  his  writings,  Luhmann  takes  up  the  classical  German  debate  on  the 
compatibility of education and freedom from the standpoint of his sociological version of 
system theory. Luhmann emphasizes that children – like other mental systems – must be 
seen as ‘self-referential’;  that  is,  they are able to ask themselves how to react  to ‘input’ 
coming from outside.  Therefore,  they can react  to  the  same input  in different  ways  on 
different  occasions.  They  are  –  in  the  terminology  of  machine  theory  –  ‘non-trivial’  
machines, although educators have a tendency, according to Luhmann, to treat them as if 
they were trivial machines. Trivial machines are easy to guide and control; they react to 
inputs in a reliable and predictable way. In contrast, non-trivial machines are essentially 
unreliable.  Thus,  the  capacity  for  self-reference  leads  to  unreliability.  In  this  context, 
Luhmann also uses the classical philosophical concepts of self-determination and freedom. 
He says that non-trivial [523] machines typically react ‘in a self-determined and unreliable 
way. To put it emphatically, one could also say that they react freely’ (Luhmann 1985/2004, 
p. 15). Luhmann accuses ‘philosophy’ of ‘re-trivializing’ the idea of freedom. His criticism is 
directed against the view that free persons act by an insight into some kind of necessity – 
they voluntarily do what they acknowledge as right or necessary (Luhmann 1986/2004, p. 
37). 
This is  one way to formulate the basic idea of the reasons-based account of freedom 
sketched out above. According to this account, the free person has the ability to take the 
course  of  action  that  she  considers  to  be  the  best  (and in  this  sense  necessary)  way to 
proceed.15 A person who is free in this sense is, to some extent, unreliable. It is often difficult 
to predict what she will do, because she might change her mind after further deliberation. 
On the other hand, we might be able to figure out what she will do if we know her beliefs  
and values and understand the situation she is in. Our prediction will then be based on our 
knowledge of her reasons.
In contrast, Luhmann states that we misunderstand the idea of freedom if we connect it  
with  the  notion  of  rational  necessity.  While  he  keeps  the  traditional  notion  of  human 
reflexivity  (self-reference,  in  the  language  of  system  theory),  he  gives  up  the  ideas  of 
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rational  deliberation and reasons-based acting. If  we do not see the agent as guided by 
reasons that can be understood by others, then his behaviour becomes indeed unreliable in 
a strong sense. We should ask, however, whether this kind of radical unreliability should be 
equated with  freedom.  In  the  philosophical  debate  on  free  will  and determinism,  it  has 
become  clear  that  the  mere  fact  of  indeterminism  does  not  secure  freedom  –  an 
undetermined act might as well be a random event. This becomes most evident from the 
first-person perspective of an agent16: if we, as agents, would consider our own acting as 
fully  unreliable,  then  this  would mean that  we  would  see  each  of our  steps  in  life  as 
radically arbitrary.  We might be said to ‘initiate’  our acts,  but we could never know in 
advance which act we will actually initiate. Now, we might say that this is a realistic way of 
looking at things. In some situations, we have in fact no idea how we ourselves or others 
will react. This, however, is mostly due to the fact that we cannot predict whether we (or 
others) will lose control; that is, whether we will act otherwise than we actually want.
Consider now the way we look at other people’s acting in our everyday relationships. 
Take the example of a teacher who gets angry at one of his pupils because the pupil lied to  
him. In this case, we might say that the teacher  resents the pupil for lying to him. Using 
Peter Strawson’s (1962) influential terminology, we can describe the teacher’s resentment as 
a  reactive attitude17 towards the pupil’s acting. The teacher’s reaction presupposes that the 
pupil is to be held responsible for what he did. If he were not seen as responsible, then the 
emotional reaction of resentment would be inadequate. It would then be appropriate to take 
an objective attitude towards him, as Strawson calls it. In taking this kind of attitude, we do 
not consider the other as  a free and responsible agent and therefore do not see him as 
blameworthy for his acting. In fact, we blame him no more than we blame a dog for biting us. 
We might try to control or mould this person’s [524] behaviour, but we will not reprove him 
when he acts wrongly, since we do not expect him to understand that he has done wrong.
It  might  be  asked whether  it  is  in  fact  adequate  to  consider  children  as  responsible 
agents. Of course, we do not hold children responsible in the same way that we do adults.  
But, as Tamar Schapiro (1999, p. 717) points out, ‘this is not to say that we do not hold 
children responsible for their actions in any sense. But the knowledge that  an agent is a 
child rather than an adult often prompts us to modify our “reactive attitudes“’. The fact that 
we  do  hold  them  responsible  might  be  justified  by  ascribing  to  them  a  basic  form  of 
freedom – the ability to act on reasons. On the other hand, we might say that our tendency 
to modify our moral reactions is due to the fact that children are not yet fully autonomous or 
competent. The insight in children’s basic freedom and their lack of fully fledged autonomy 
is  apt  to  ground  our  specifically  educational  attitudes  towards  them.  The  teacher  who 
resents his pupil for lying may connect pedagogical intentions with this reaction. He wants 
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the child to accept the idea that lying is wrong. He hopes that the child will think to have 
reason not to lie in the future.
Thus, in our everyday relationships, we do no see other people as radically unreliable. 
We consider them to be free and responsible beings and have nevertheless both descriptive 
and normative expectations towards them,  for instance, we expect them to act on moral 
reasons.  Our  pedagogical  attitudes  towards  children  are  of  a  specific  nature  –  we 
(normatively) expect them to accept certain considerations as reasons and to act on them 
voluntarily.
According  to  Luhmann,  this  account  of  the  educational  process  tends  to  re-trivialize 
children, that is, to see them not as free persons, but as trivial machines. It should be noted  
that Luhmann’s idea of freedom does not exclude the mere possibility of influencing some 
other person’s behaviour. Unlike Kant’s noumenal selves, Luhmann’s non-trivial machines 
are capable of development and are open to  inputs stemming from their environments. 
However, the relation between the educational inputs and their effects on the learner must 
be described as a matter of mere contingency,  according to Luhmann. On the other hand, 
Luhmann  thinks  that  the  so-called  trivial  machines  that  are  not  to  be  seen  as  self-
determined  can  be  deterministically directed.  Luhmann  thus  supports  the  view  that 
freedom is incompatible with deterministic education.
The  same  conclusion  can  be  drawn  on  the  basis  of  the  reasons-based  view.  But  in 
contrast to Luhmann’s account, this view of freedom leaves room for a non-deterministic 
notion of intentional education. The basic  idea is  that education is  to be described as a 
specific  kind  of  communication  –  i.e.,  a  communication  of  reasons.  Pedagogical 
communication  should  not,  however,  be  conflated  with  a  rational  discourse  (in  a 
Habermasian sense). According to the idea of the discursive communication, good reasons 
have a specific form of power that compels rational persons to accept them. This kind of 
rational compulsion is certainly compatible with autonomy or freedom – rational argument 
can only be fully effective in the communication with autonomous beings.
[525] Children, it was assumed, are not fully autonomous or rational. Hence, we cannot 
expect  them  to  be  sensitive  to  good  arguments.  Nevertheless,  offering  arguments  to 
children might be a part of the practice of education. But when I define education as a 
communication of reasons, I do not mean this, in the first place: Consider the teacher who 
reproves his pupil for lying: This teacher’s primary intention is not to convince the pupil – 
by providing good arguments – that lying is morally wrong. He simply wants the pupil to 
accept  that  it  is  wrong to  lie  and to  act  accordingly.  As a  person endowed with basic 
freedom, the pupil has the ability to refuse or accept the teacher’s normative expectations. 
Both his refusal and acceptance might be unqualified in the sense that it is not based on 
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good reasons. So, if he accepts that lying is wrong, this might be explained by the fact that 
he recognises the teacher as an authority.
Basic  freedom can be seen as  an obstacle  to education:  we cannot rely on children’s 
accepting  a  consideration  as  a  reason.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  freedom  is  also  a 
precondition of  education.  Only free  selves  can be moulded in  this  way,  since only free 
persons have the capacity to accept a consideration as a reason. Thus, children’s educability 
is grounded in this capacity.
Conclusions
As a reaction to both versions of the dilemma described in the introduction, a reasons-based 
understanding of freedom was developed. 
The first version of the dilemma arises from a concept of ultimate responsibility that 
leaves no room for education. According to this view of freedom, an action cannot be seen 
as free if it is guided by reasons learned throughout one’s upbringing. The notion of basic 
freedom, by contrast, ensures that children can be seen at the same time 1) as educable and 
2) as endowed with free will.
As was made clear in the second part, the concept of basic freedom is incompatible with 
pedagogical determination. Therefore, the second version of the dilemma cannot be solved 
as long as education is understood in a deterministic way. The learner, as a free person, is 
unreliable in his acting. But as a reason-guided being, he cannot be said to be radically 
unreliable in Luhmann’s sense. He possesses the ability to do otherwise than that which is 
expected of him, but he is able to act as he thinks adequate, and to learn from others to 
distinguish adequate from inadequate courses of action. He is educable in the sense that he 
is  open  to  the  pedagogical  communication  of  reasons.  Thus,  to  describe  the  child  as 
educable does not  imply that  he has to be conceived as  a passive object of  educational 
manipulation. Education can be considered as a tuning of (free) agency18.The problem of an 
education  for  autonomy  is  not  how  an  unfree  object  can  be  transformed  into  an 
autonomous subject, but how the child’s basic freedom can be cultivated to become full-
blooded autonomy.
1 It should be noted that the deliberations in this paper are not situated on an ethical level. Thus, 
my intention is  not  to  clarify whether (certain forms of)  educational  heteronomy are morally 
compatible with freedom or autonomy. 
2 It is not my aim here to illuminate the historical background of this debate. Moreover, I will not 
provide  a detailed account of Herbart’s argument against transcendental philosophy.
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3 Similarly,  Derk  Pereboom  (2001)  speaks  of  leeway  incompatibilists  –  as  contrasted  to  source  
incompatibilists. 
4 Galen Strawson has presented his view in various versions. In what follows, I rely on Strawson 
(2002).
5 This  theory  was  first  outlined  in  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason and  further  developed  in  the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the  Critique of Practical Reason. Useful comments on 
Kant’s account of free will are provided by Beck (1960), Allison (1990) and Pereboom (2006). 
6 In this paper, Kant’s theory of freedom is used to elucidate a substantial problem of educational 
thought, and it is not my aim to develop a comprehensive account of Kant’s theory of moral  
education. Thus, the question whether Kant’s theory of freedom really leaves no room for the 
possibility of education shall not be answered, here (instead, see Giesinger 2012).
7 An influential account of this kind was proposed by Lewis White Beck (1960), who distinguishes 
the actor’s from the spectator’s perspective on human acting. 
8 This does not mean, of course, that the moral agent should not take into account the empirical 
features of the situation that he is acting in.
9 The English version of the text (Herbart 1835/1901) offers two different translations of Bildsamkeit 
– educability and plasticity. It was Fichte (1796/1960) who first used the term in a philosophical 
context:  According  to  Fichte,  the  human  being  is  bildsam in  the  sense  that  his  acting  and 
development is not fixed by nature. It is often assumed that Fichte’s use of the term is influenced 
by Rousseau’s  deliberation on the  perfectibilité of  the human being (see Rousseau 1755/1992). 
Thus, Bildsamkeit might be translated as perfectibility. 
10 Timothy O’Connor’s writings can be read as an attempt to provide an agent-causalist account that 
integrates the reasons-based view (see e.g. O’Connor 2002).
11 This  view  is  defended  by  Harry  Frankfurt  (1988).  In  current  debates,  it  is  described  as  a 
„structuralist“ or „internalist“ view – as opposed to „historicist“ or „externlist“ accounts (see e.g.  
Zimmermann 2003, Noggle 2005 or Cuypers 2009).
12 Additionally, we have to take into account, of course, that (small) children lack self-control, that 
is, they might be dominated by impulses that they do not want to act on.
13 It seems clear that newborn babies lack the capacity to act on reasons. This raises the question 
how this capacity evolves within the first year of the human life. I will not, however, discuss this 
crucial  question,  here.  As long as  the child  is  not  free  (in  a basic  sense),  the problem of the 
compatibility of free will and educational heteronomy does not arise.
14 Stefaan Cuypers (2009; see also Cuypers/Haji 2008) discusses this point in detail: can an adult’s 
attitudes and actions be seen as authentic (that is, his own), if their occurrence was influenced by 
education? Cuypers claims that it makes no sense to describe children’s attitudes as authentic, but 
he does not deny that attitudes that are brought about educationally might become authentic, 
later on. He does not, however, provide an elucidation of this process. His argument focusses on 
cases of inauthenticity, that is, cases in which educational interferences bring about attitudes that 
are not the (future) adult’s own. 
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15 It  should be made clear,  however,  that  this  is  a  rather  weak understanding of  the  notion of 
rational necessity. Kant assumes that there is an objective ‘necessity of reason’ that should guide 
our actions independently of our personal attitudes and desires. Luhmann’s attack against the 
philosophical re-trivialization of freedom is directed against Kant’s (or Hegel’s) notion of free will  
in the first place. Luhmann was unfamiliar with recent compatibilist accounts of free will.
16 Luhmann’s sociological approach is committed to a third-person (or spectator’s) perspective and 
does not take into account the first-person perspective of the agent. 
17 Our reactive attitudes are a part of what Jürgen Habermas lately (2007) called the second-person (or 
participant’s)  perspective  on  human  acting,  as  contrasted  to  the  spectator’s  perspective.  As 
participants in everyday (I-Thou) relationships, we cannot help seeing the other person’s acting as 
guided  by  reasons.  We  could  say,  then,  that  Habermas  implements  the  reasons-based 
understanding of freedom into a broadly Strawsonian picture of moral relationsships. Strawson 
himself does not explicitly endorse this account of freedom. He refrains from specifying what 
should be meant by freedom and moral responsibility. However, he is sure not to agree with his son, 
Galen  Strawson,  that  the  everyday  practice  of  blaming  others  could  only  be  justified  by 
introducing a (source libertarian) notion of ultimate responsibility. 
18 I owe this formulation to Michael Luntley (2010).
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